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GARA AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE:
AFTER THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN ROBINSON
V. HARTZELL PROPELLERS
MICHAEL HESSION*
T HE GENERAL AVIATION Revitalization Act (GARA) is a
powerful statute of repose, shielding the manufacturers of
aviation products from liability against claims arising more than
eighteen years after the product in question was manufactured.'
According to the Ninth Circuit, "the GARA statute of repose...
creates an explicit statutory right not to stand trial which would
be irretrievably lost should [the defendant] be forced to defend
itself in a full trial."2 On that basis, the court determined that-
under the collateral order doctrine-immediate appellate juris-
diction existed over a lower court's denial of a dispositive mo-
tion to dismiss under the GARA's statute of repose.'
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit recently held that the GARA's
statute of repose did not qualify for immediate appeal under the
collateral order doctrine.4 In Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc.,
the court found that the circuit's "historical reluctance" to ex-
pand the collateral order doctrine-coupled with factual ques-
tions in the underlying matter the court believed were not
separable from the merits-mitigated against exercising inter-
locutory appellate jurisdiction over the denial of a dispositive
* Michael Hession is an attorney in Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell's litigation
department, and is resident in the firm's Atlanta office. His practice focuses on
aerospace and aviation law, including representation of aviation and aerospace
component manufacturers, airlines and maintenance companies in multi-district
and international litigation. Mr. Hession has defended his clients in major air
disaster and general aviation aircraft accident litigation, both domestically and
abroad. He received his B.A. from Boston University and his J.D. from the
Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University.
1 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000).
2 Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2002).
3 Id. at 1111.
4 Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir. 2006).
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GARA motion.5 Ironically, within two months of the Robinson
decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the collat-
eral order doctrine to the GARA and, following the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rationale, accepted an immediate appeal of a denied
motion for summary judgment. 6
This seeming contradiction therefore begs the question: What
exactly is the collateral order doctrine and when does it apply, if
at all, to the GARA?
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COLLATERAL
ORDER DOCTRINE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a circuit court has jurisdiction
to hear an appeal where a "final order" has been rendered by a
district court.7 Most jurisdictions consider an order to be "final"
when it "terminates the litigation between the parties on the
merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined."8 The denial of a mo-
tion for summary judgment is not typically considered a "final
order" because "far from finally deciding the case, it is a deci-
sion to permit the litigation to continue. '
Long ago, however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
certain non-final orders exist "which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the ac-
tion, too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be de-
ferred until the whole case is adjudicated."10 The collateral or-
der doctrine eventually evolved from Cohen, and now permits an
immediate appeal of a non-final order if the order: (1) conclu-
sively determines a disputed legal question; (2) resolves an im-
portant issue completely separable from the merits of the
action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from the
ultimate final judgment."
Certain issues indisputably qualify under this test, and disposi-
tive motions based on these issues are subject to the collateral
5 Id.
6 See Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 423-24 (Pa. 2006).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
8 Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting St. Louis, Iron
Mountain, & S. Ry. Co. v. S. Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1883)).
9 Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2003).
10 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
11 Bell Atl.-Pa. Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 273 F.3d 337, 342-43 (3d Cir.
2001).
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order doctrine. These issues typically implicate constitutional
rights, statutory provisions, or compelling public privacy.' 2 Con-
versely, orders denying motions that are important, but never-
theless do not rise to the narrow standard articulated by the
Cohen Court and its progeny are universally denied collateral or-
der appellate status. 3
Between the clear lines of black and white described above,
other issues are murkier and have resulted in jurisdictional split-
ting on whether the collateral order doctrine is available in such
circumstances. These grey-area issues include the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and civil contempt sanctions, with different circuit
courts reaching different decisions on whether an immediate
appeal is available. 4
II. THE GARA AS AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL: YES,
NO, OR SOMETIMES?
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet opined on the
applicability of the collateral order doctrine to the GARA, Estate
of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 5-which broadly permits
interlocutory appeals under the GARA-was the definitive case
on this issue until recently. With the Third Circuit's recent re-
fusal to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a denied GARA mo-
12 See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
147 (1993) (discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982) (discussing absolute immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor,
442 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1979) (discussing the Speech or Debate Clause); Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (discussing double jeopardy).
13 See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868-69
(1994) (finding no interlocutory appeal on orders denying motion based on a
defense of accord and satisfaction); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495,
500-01 (1989) (finding no interlocutory appeal of order denying motion based
on a defense of a contractual choice-of-venue provision); Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1988) (finding no interlocutory appeal on orders
denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
14 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 960-61 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that the attorney-client privilege is the type of "institutionally sig-
nificant status or relationship" that justifies collateral order review); but cf Tex-
aco, Inc. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 995 F.2d 43, 43-44 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the collateral order doctrine is inapplicable to discovery orders in-
volving claims of attorney-client privilege). See also FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202
F.3d 454, 459-60 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that civil contempt sanction can be
appealed on interlocutory basis); but cf Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298, 300 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (holding that a civil contempt citation is not appealable as a collateral
order).
15 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
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tion in Robinson, a reconsideration of the applicability of the
doctrine to the GARA is now necessary.
A. ESTATE OF KENNEDY v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
he Estate of Kennedy case arose due to a helicopter that crashed
while conducting aerial logging in the state of Washington as
the result of fatigue cracking in a component of the aircraft's
tail boom.16 The aircraft's manufacturer filed a motion to dis-
miss on summary judgment, arguing that the helicopter had
been produced over twenty-six years prior to the crash, making
the manufacturer immune from suit under the GARA.17 The
plaintiff argued that the GARA eighteen-year repose period did
not begin to run until the aircraft, which had formerly been sold
to and utilized by the Navy, became certificated for civilian use;
this certification occurred less than eighteen years prior to the
crash. 8 The district court agreed with the plaintiff and denied
the GARA motion.19 The defendant filed a notice of appeal,
arguing that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate under the
collateral order doctrine.2 °
The Ninth Circuit conducted an analysis of the existence of its
appellate jurisdiction, noting that the doctrine was applicable
only to a "narrow class of decisions" and should "never be al-
lowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a
single appeal" after final judgment. 21 The court recognized that
in order to qualify, the decision at issue "must be conclusive,
resolve important questions completely separate from the mer-
its, and render such important questions effectively unreview-
able on appeal from a final judgment in the underlying
action. 22
Finding that the first two factors of this standard were clearly
met, the appeals court focused on whether the third factor-
that an order was essentially unreviewable if not immediately ap-
pealed-was satisfied.2 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court for
guidance, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "the deprivation of
the right not to be tried satisfie[d] the third collateral order
16 Id. at 1109.
17 Id. at 1112.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1109.
20 Id. at 1109-10.
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condition when the right is created by an explicit statutory...
guarantee that trial will not occur. '24 Reviewing the express lan-
guage of the statute, the court found that the GARA satisfied
this requirement because it "lift[ed] the requirement that man-
ufacturers abide the possibility of litigation for the indefinite fu-
ture when they sell an airplane. 25
The court distinguished a statute of repose from a statute of
limitation (for which interlocutory appeals are not available)
and stated that the "focus of a statute of repose is entirely differ-
ent from the focus of a statute of limitation[ ].'26 A statute of
limitation merely creates a safeguard against delinquent suits,
while a statute of repose recognizes that it is unfair to force a
party to defend itself long after the product in question was
manufactured. 27 The court stated that "[i]t is clear that an es-
sential aspect of the GARA statute of repose is the right to be
free from the burdens of trial," and, thus found the collateral
order doctrine applied.2 8
B. ROBINSON V. HARTZELL PROPELLER
The case of Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc. 29 arose from the
crash of a small aircraft which was equipped with a propeller
manufactured by the defendant twenty-five years before the acci-
dent and thus warranted protection by the GARA's eighteen
year statute of repose.3 ° Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that
the GARA was not applicable because the defendant allegedly
made several material misrepresentations to the FAA when ob-
taining a type certificate for the propeller, thus triggering an
exception to the GARA's statute of repose for crashes proxi-
mately caused by such misrepresentations." The district court
agreed with the plaintiff and denied the defendant's GARA mo-
tion, and the defendant subsequently appealed to the Third Cir-
cuit, citing Estate of Kennedy as precedent for the proposition that
24 Id. (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 800-01
(1989)).
25 Id. at 1110-11 (citing Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir.
2001) (emphasis omitted)).
26 Id. at 1111.
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 454 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2006).
30 Id. at 165.
31 Id.
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an interlocutory appeal was appropriate in these
circumstances.32
The Third Circuit opined that the "key consideration ... [is]
whether the claimed right sought to be protected was character-
ized as a right to immunity from suit or a defense to liability. 33
If it is the former, an interlocutory appeal is generally appropri-
ate; if it is the latter, only a single appeal at the conclusion of the
litigation is typically permitted. 4
In applying this analysis to the GARA, the Third Circuit found
that it could not exercise appellate jurisdiction on this particular
issue. 5 First, the court disagreed with the Estate of Kennedy analy-
sis and found parallels between the GARA's statute of repose
language and the language in the federal default statute of limi-
tations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658.36 The court found that the GARA is
more similar to a statute of limitation than to a grant of quali-
fied immunity as "both are designed primarily to protect private
parties from liability on stale claims. ' 37 The court also found
that the GARA's statute of repose "is not a pure immunity be-
cause it contains exceptions under which immunity does not at-
tach," and stated that the immunities that the collateral order
doctrine is designed to protect should have no such excep-
tions.3 The Robinson decision also went a step further and, rely-
ing on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen, stated that the
collateral order doctrine will apply in cases of claimed immunity
only where the order "turns on an issue of law," as opposed to
fact, because where a fact is at issue, the immunities issue is not
"completely separate from the merits. '39
C. PRIDGEN v. PARKER HANNIFIN
Just a month after the Robinson decision was handed down by
the Third Circuit (sitting in Pennsylvania), the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court issued its decision in Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin
Corp., finding that an appeal of a GARA decision fell under the
collateral order doctrine.4 ° While the Pennsylvania Supreme
32 Id. at 167-68, 172.
33 Id. at 171.
34 See id. at 171-72.
35 Id. at 165.
36 Id. at 172-73.
37 Id. at 173.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 434 (Pa. 2006).
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Court accepted that its decision reflected a "respectful disagree-
ment" with the Third Circuit's ruling in Robinson, it also distin-
guished the respective courts' reasoning on certain critical
points.4 1
Most importantly, unlike in Robinson, the appeal in Pridgen
arose mainly from the GARA's "rolling provision," which restarts
the eighteen-year repose period for components installed after
the original manufacture date.4 2 Pridgen involved a thirty-one-
year-old Piper aircraft that crashed on departure, killing several
people.4" The complaint alleged that the crash was caused by
components which had been replaced within the eighteen-year
repose period and that there were misrepresentations made to
the FAA, thereby implicating the "fraud on the FAA" exception
to the GARA.4 4
The Pridgen court found that the matter met the criteria ar-
ticulated by the Cohen decision such that the collateral order
doctrine applied.45 First, the court found that in order to settle
the legal dispute at the heart of the appeal, the appellate court's
"frame of reference will be centered on the terms of GARA, not
on determinations of fact."' 46 Second, in terms of importance,
the court recognized the importance of the matter, because in
passing GARA, Congress "was concerned with exposure of cov-
ered aviation manufactures to both liability in damages and as-
sociated litigation CoStS. ' ' 47 Finally, the court found that the
costs of defending a complex litigation comprised a "sufficient
loss to support allowing interlocutory appellate review as of
right, in light of the clear federal policy to contain such costs in
the public interest."4
The Pridgen court agreed with the Third Circuit's reasoning in
Robinson, however, that interlocutory appeals are typically appro-
priate only when they implicate strict questions of law, not fact.
49
Such rationale comports with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling
41 Id.
42 See id. at 432.
43 Id. at 425.
- See id.
45 Id. at 426, 433-34.
46 Id. at 433.
47 Id.
48 Id.
41 See id. at 434.
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in Johnson v. Jones.50 While the facts underlying the Pridgen plain-
tiff's claims in relation to the "fraud in the FAA" exception were
not implicated in the appeal, dicta suggests that to the extent an
underlying order denied a GARA claim on the basis of a factual
dispute related to this exception, it may not fall under the lim-
ited holding in Pridgen.51
III. CONCLUSION
The two recent decisions out of Pennsylvania federal and state
appellate courts neither foreclose interlocutory appeals from an
adverse GARA order, nor confirm the applicability of the collat-
eral order doctrine to all GARA orders. Rather, they continue
on the path of interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cohen and its progeny. While the Estate of Kennedy case in
the Ninth Circuit and Robinson in the Third Circuit are not in
alignment, they do not completely contradict each other.
Rather, read together, the cases seem to suggest a middle
ground by which GARA orders denying dispositive motions may
ultimately be appealable through the collateral order doctrine if
they address issues that are solely legal and do not require an
analysis of factual decisions.
Ultimately, this split of authority between the circuits may
eventually result in the U.S. Supreme Court handing down a de-
cision on the issue. The Court has not addressed the collateral
order doctrine for some years, and it may be time for the doc-
trine to be considered by the highest court in the context of the
GARA. Until that time, both Robinson and Pridgen will likely pro-
vide foundation to both plaintiffs and defendants in their con-
tinuing efforts to avoid and utilize, respectively, the GARA, at
both the trial and appellate levels.
50 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1995), for the U.S. Supreme
Court's analysis of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit against police officers for
excessive use of force.
51 See Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 437.
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